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Argentina recently passed legislation strengthening its patent
laws, capitulating to intense pressure from the U.S. drug industry
that has lasted for over a decade.' The pharmaceutical dispute
between the United States and Argentina is not over, however.2
The United States imposed sanctions against Argentina on $260
million of its U.S. exports in early 1997 to protest alleged
inadequacies in the new patent law?
President Clinton's October 1997 visit to Argentina failed to
resolve the ongoing conflict.4 Clinton argued that his 1994
proposal for the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA")
should be adopted by 2005.' Argentina made it clear that the
FTAA will be negotiated without side-stepping the sub-regional
trading bloc, Common Market of the South ("MERCOSUR"),
which loosely joined the markets of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
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1 See The Path to Patent Law as Taken by Argentina, MARKETLETTER, Jan.
29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8314654.
2 See Menem Rejects U.S. Request to Reform Law on Medicine Patents,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3752343
(statement of Jorge Campbell, Argentina's Secretary of International Economic
Relations) ("The egislation on medicine patents will be 'a permanent issue' for
discussion on the agenda of both countries.").
I See An Unhealthy Trade Policy, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Jan. 11,
1997, at 6.
' See Christian Chaise, Latin American Tour Yields Only Modest Results for




Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
and Paraguay in 1995 with surprising success.6 The United States
seeks to increase trade with Latin America to make up for lost
time during which the European Union became MERCOSUR's
main trading partner! The United States is still the leading
foreign investor in Argentina, having already invested $8 billion
and promising about $5 billion over the next five years! The
growing market for pharmaceuticals and health care products
makes the drug industry an attractive investment, especially if
patent laws prevent copiers from competing with brand-name,
patented drugs. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry typically aims
trade complaints at countries with developing industries, like
Argentina, that compete successfully against U.S. manufacturers
in their domestic markets." Argentina's health care market,
valued at $3.7 billion,10 grew 80.2% from 1991 to 1995.11 The
potential health care markets in developing countries in Latin
America and Asia may dwarf the existing pharmaceutical markets
in the developed world.
12
President Menem of Argentina proved to be Clinton's
strongest ally during his tour of Latin America. 3 Argentina,
6 See Stephen Fidler, Important Shifts in Position, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 1, 1997, at 1.
7 See Marcela Valente, LATAM: Important Shift in Clinton Views on
Regional Integration, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 18, 1997, available in 1997
WL 13257233.
' See Argentina-U.S.: Clinton Reaffirms Alliance with Argentina, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13257172 (emphasizing
that Argentina prefers to negotiate for FTAA within MERCOSUR and that
the FTAA will not serve as replacement for thesubregional bloc).
" See Robert Weissman, A Lon& Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical
Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the
Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1078 (1996).
10 See Sarah MacDonald, Fine Chemicals Thrive in South American Market,
MANUFACTURING CHEMIST, Aug. 1, 1997, at 21.
" See Latin America: Brazil is Booming, Argentina and the Rest Lag Behind,
MED AD NEWS, May 1, 1997, at 4. But see Robert M. Sherwood, 7e TRIPS
Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 501 (1997)
(noting that the total pharmaceutical industry accounts for less than 1.5% of
the nation's economy and predicting a barely discernible macro-economic
impact if the prices of drugs increase).
'" See Health Care in the Developing World, MARKETLETTER, Apr. 17, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 2152437 (discussing Argentina's patent law and
international pressure for stronger patent rights).
13 See Chaise, supra note 4.
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democratic since 1983,"4 performed an about-face in the late 1980s
and began to support the U.S. position on many international
issues."5  For intellectual property, however, Argentina has
continued to carve out an independent position. 6 Since 1985, the
U.S. Trade Representative, through the efforts of a strong drug
industry lobby lead by the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers Association ("PhRMA"), has tried to overcome
Argentine resistance to a strong intellectual property regime" and
present Argentina to the rest of Latin America as an example of
the economic cost of not respecting strong patent rights. 8
Intellectual property issues have grown in prominence over
the last ten years, particularly for trade policy.19 Governments
exercise an exceptional degree of scrutiny and control over
patents for pharmaceuticals because of their social relevance to
national health.2" In both the United States and Argentina,
powerful drug lobbies contribute to a highly politicized battle
over Argentina's self-determination to develop a patent regime
that adequately meets its need for progress and stability. Political,
social, and judicial resistance to a strong intellectual property
regime remain strong despite the new legislation.21 The U.S. drug
14 See Alejandro M. Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in
Argentina: Partial Failure or Qualified Success?, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1, 7 (1993) (chronicling the Argentine transition to democracy).
15 Valente, supra note 7; See also CARLOS ESCUD, FOREIGN POLICY
THEORY IN MENEM'S ARGENTINA 1-2 (1997) (describing the hostility that used
to characterize the relationship between Argentina and the United States).
16 See Fidler, supra note 6, at 1.
17 See generally The Path to Patent Law as Taken by Argentina, supra note 1.
, See Nathaniel C. Nash, U.S. Presses Argentina on Patents, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1993, at D3. Claiming to have resisted-U.S. pressure, Argentina openly
promoted its new patent law when consulting with other South American
countries about pending patent legislation in 1995. See Venezuela Looks to
Argentina on Patents, MARKETLETTER, Oct. 16, 1995, available in 1995 WL
11090137.
19 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 65
(Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] (explaining that the globalization of
markets and the increase of high-technofogy products in international trade
have brought attention to intellectual property rights).
20 See GARY GEREFFI, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND
DEPENDENCY IN THE THIRD WORLD 167 (1983).
21 In Argentina, "an assertive campaign against patent protection for
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industry should engage in non-lobbying activities that will inspire
respect for strong patent protection from within the country
while exploring other alternatives to protect its business interests
in Argentina.
This Comment explores Argentina's resistance to strong
intellectual property protection. Section 2 reviews the history
and current state of Argentina's patent regime, including a
discussion of judicial and enforcement problems, compliance with
international agreements, and the conflict that U.S. pressure has
generated between Argentina's executive and legislative branches.
Section 3 discusses, in general terms, the factors that determine
what patent regime a nation will adopt and proposes an equation
to broadly illustrate how a valuation of these factors determines a
particular regime. Section 4 presents both the case for and against
a strong intellectual property regime in Argentina, concluding
with the stronger case of recognizing Argentina's sovereignty to
determine its own patent policies. Even if a stronger regime is
theoretically better for Argentina in the long term, the current
coercive activity of the U.S. drug industry to enact Argentine
legislation results in democratic instability and its effectiveness is
severely limited by Argentine resistance. Section 5 proposes non-
patent alternatives to protect pharmaceutical patent rights and
foster more respect for such rights.
2. ARGENTINA'S LEGAL PATENT SYSTEM
2.1. Legislation
2. 1. 1. History
Argentina's 1864 patent law excluded pharmaceutical
pharmaceuticals has produced a predominantly negative impression of
intellectual property in much of the population." Robert M. Sherwood,
Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of Systems
in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261, 290 (1997); see also Argentina
Won't Alter Patent Law Desite US. Trade Measure, Dow Jones News Service,
Apr. 15, 1997, at 23:55:00 (noting the Argentine Foreign Minister's refusal to
change the controversial patent law); cf Conferences, 52 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 392, 393 (1996) (discussing a "fundamental cultural
difference"-Latin Americans do not believe that a creation of the mind
should be linked to money).
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compositions from patent protection.' Drug prices remained
low for over a century because Argentina recognized process, not
product, patent protection.' The U.S. drug industry found that
the difficulty in proving process infringement made these patents
ineffective. 24 In 1985, the U.S. Trade Representative encouraged
Argentina to amend alleged inadequacies of the 1864 patent law
by placing Argentina on either the Special 301 "watch list" or the
"priority watch list" from 1989 through 1993.' Menem warded
off trade retaliation under this special watch status by promising
to bring patentability of pharmaceutical products in line with
modern legislation.26
Initial bills in the Argentine Congress offered hope for greater
protection, but progress on a patent bill was tabled in 1993 until
the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade negotiations concluded. Argentina ratified the World
Trade Organization (formerly "GATT") and Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") in January 1995.27 TRIPS
' See Patents of Invention, Argentine Law No. 111, tit. I, art. 4, Oct. 11,
1864, in John P. Sinnott & William J. Cotreau, 2B WORLD PATENT LAW AND
PRACTICE 2-Argentina (1997) [hereinafter Argentine Patent Act] ("The
following is not patentable: pharmaceutical compositions....").
If only a process is protected, an imitator may legally devise a similar
but distinct way to make and market the same product. See Mahesh Uniyal,
GAT. Drug Firms Fear U.S.-Based TNC's Will Swamp Global Markets, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 9, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2535843.
24 See President Pharm. Research and Mfr. ofAm. before the Senate Comm. on
Gov't Affairs, July 27, 1994, at 312 (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
president of PhRMA) [hereinafterMossinghoff Testimony].
' See Robert S. Tancer & Shoshana B. Tancer, MERCOSUR and the
Pharmaceutical Industry - Waiting for a Common Patent Regime, LATIN AM. L.
& Bus. REP., Apr. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9499053.
Under "Super 301" from the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, the U.S. Trade Representative may investigate and retaliate against
countries who engage in "unfair competition." "Priority Foreign Countries"
have the most "onerous or egregious" practices that deny intellectual
protection or equitable market access. Retaliation usually takes the form of
suspending trade benefits, imposing duties or other import restrictions and
entering binding agreements designed to stop the offending practices. See
Theresa Beeby Lewis, Patent Protection for the Pharmaceutical Industry: A
Survey of the Patent Laws of Various Countries, 30 INT'L LAW. 835, 852-53
(1996).
26 See id.
' See The Path to Patent Law as Taken by Argentina, supra note 1; see
generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
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lived up to its expected ability to achieve a high threshold of
intellectual property protection because it was the first
international intellectual property negotiation within a specific
trade context, namely the GATT.28 TRIPS effectively links
preferential trade treatment with patent protection. The threat of
costly trade sanctions deters nations from deviating from TRIPS
standards.29  Developing nations, although submitting to a
framework of very high protection, negotiated general wording
into Article 30, which allows exceptions to conferred patent
rights.3
2.1.2. Current Legislation
Argentina's Congress undertook the task of passing a bill in
1995 that would conform to its broad interpretation of exceptions
under Article 30 of TRIPS and respond to the demands of its
strong pharmaceutical industry.3' In April of 1995, under intense
pressure from the United States, Menem vetoed provisions of this
drug-patent legislation that allegedly conflicted with a U.S.-*
Argentina trade accord.32 Menem then issued a "Regulatory
Decree" which would protect pharmaceutical patents as of
January 1, 1996, and give immediate retroactive pipeline
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1, 83-111 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
28 See GLOBAL DIMENsIONs IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra
note 19, at 15-16 (discussing the advantages of the intellectual property
safeguards then being negotiated as part of Uruguay Round of GATT).
29 See Carlos M. Correa, The GA T Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights: New Standards or Patent Protection, 8 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 327, 327 (1994). Trade retaliation is allowed against any sector,
not just the industry which gives rise to the trade dispute. See id.
31 See id. at 330.
31 See generally The Path to Patent Law as Taken by Argentina, supra note 1
(noting PhRMA's disgust with the "watered down" bill).
32 See Calvin Sims, Argentine President Vetoes Patent Measure, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1995, at D5. The provisions that supposedly conflicted with the trade
accord included both a requirement that the patent holder produce the product
in Argentina and an eight-year grace period without royalties for usingothers'
inventions. See id. But see Correa, supra note 29, at 331, 334 (describing an
allowable grace period of ten years for new patentable areas such as
pharmaceuticals in Argentina that were not previously protected and an
interpretation of TRIPS that would allow granting compulsory licenses for
lack of importation if such a license was granted on equal f6oting with a license
for lack of domestic production).
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protection.33
When the Senate returned to patent legislation in May 1995, it
immediately overturned ten of the sixteen key provisions of
Menem's Presidential Decree. The Argentine House concurred
with the Senate's vote and passed Law 24,481."4 Menem then
submitted a "corrective law" in June 1995 which reduced the
transition period for implementing pharmaceutical protection
from ten to five years.3 Congress responded with a law in March
1996 implementing Menem's five-year transition period and
establishing a framework for compulsory licensing. Menem
signed a decree on March 22, 1996, enacting this legislation. 7 On
December 18, 1996, Congress passed a surprising new non-patent
provision which permits an innovator's competitors to use the
innovator's test data when the competitors seek marketing
approval. The U.S. drug industry charged that this additional
"data confidentiality" legislation "was a thinly disguised attempt
to invalidate the pharmaceutical patent protection which had just
recently been approved."39
3 See The Path to Patent Law as Taken by Argentina, supra note 1.
Pipeline protection requires nations with newly-enacted patent laws to
recognize products already patented in other nations for the remainder of their
patent terms, even though they are not "new," the usual condition for
patentability. See Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual
Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 465, 478-79 (1994) (discussing the particular effect of pipeline protection
on the pharmaceutical industry).
14 See The Path to Patent Law as Taken by Argentina, supra note 1.
35 See id.
36 See Robert Jacobs et al., Argentina Adopts Patent Law, 8 No. 6 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 24 (1996).
A compulsory license requires a patent-holder to grant non-exclusive
licenses to competitors or other interested persons in exchange for a reasonable
licensing fee. See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1073. Under the 1996 legislation,
licenses must be granted when the patent is not exploited in Argentina. The
production, distribution, and commercialization of products must satisfy the
demands of the national market. See Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein,
Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading
Agreements, 12AM. U. J. INT'L L. &POL'Y 769, 813 (1997).
37 See Lewis, supra note 25, at 858.
38 See U.S. Imposes Sanctions over Argentine Pharmaceutical Patent Laws, 9
No. 4J. PROPRIETARYRTS. 36 (1997).
39 Tancer & Tancer, supra note 25.
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2.1.3. Sanctions
The United States responded with trade sanctions on $260
million of Argentina's exports, revoking half of its favorable tariff
treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences pursuant
to Section 301 of the 1988 Trade Act.4" A U.S. Trade
Representative official admitted that it decided to enforce the
patent law-related sanctions based entirely on data and
information supplied by PhRMA.4" Currently, the U.S. Trade
Representative is considering revoking the rest of Argentina's
preferential tariff treatment.' Argentina has responded by
threatening to push back the transition period for TRIPS
compliance by five more years to 2005.43
2.1.4. Comparative Analysis of the Strength ofArgentina's
Patent Regime
Robert Sherwood, an international business advisor for
intellectual property issues,' reviewed intellectual property
regimes using a point scale to assess a regime's effectiveness in
stimulating private investment.4" Argentina, as of April 1996,
received thirty-nine of one hundred possible points. Sherwood
found its patent regime particularly weak, subtracting thirteen of
seventeen possible points; he believes that the 1996 patent law
clashes with the TRIPS Agreement and creates complexities that
4 See An Unhealthy Trade Policy, supra note 3; see also Weissman, supra
note 9, at 1078 (discussing U.S. Trade Representative threats against third
world countries that had beun to develop domestic industries to compete
against U.S. pharmaceutical companies).
" See An Unhealthy Trade Policy, supra note 3 (outlining the aggressive
tactics employed by the USTR in Argentina); See also Argentina: Investment
Climate Statementfor 1997, INT'L MARKET INSIGHT REP., Apr. 16, 1997, at Al
(discussing the favorable climate for U.S. investment in Argentina).
42 See Kevin G. Hall, Tension Mounts in U.S.-Argentine Spat Over Drug
Patents, J. COM., Dec. 10, 1997, at 1A.
43 See id.
4 See Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Seminar on Legal Aspects of Doing
Business in Latin America: Free Markets in Latin America: New Games- New
Rules, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 191, 255 (1993) (containing material by Robert
Sherwood on patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry).
41 See Sherwood, supra note 21, at 289. The point scale is discussed further
at infra Section 3.1. A score of about 70 indicates sufficient protection to
sustain more than low levels of technological activity. See id. at 353.
1108 [19:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss4/5
1998] PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTLEGISLA TION
will likely require litigation before it is workable.46
Despite Sherwood's criticism, he acknowledges that the 1996
bill improves protection in many respects. Patent protection
extends to a broader range of subject matter, including utility
models.47 Also, protection is for a full twenty-year term.48
Although compulsory licenses for dependent patents are given
almost readily, this provision may actually encourage
innovation. 9 Provisions allowing compulsory licensing with
many novel features, however, diminish the overall value of a
patent. For example, if the price of a patented product is higher
than an unpatented equivalent, use of the patented invention can
be granted to others without the approval of the patent holder."0
2.2. Compliance with International Agreements
2.2.1. TRIPS Compliance
Negotiating international agreements is less coercive than
applying unilateral economic sanctions to achieve extra-territorial
legislative goals."' WTO membership is a carrot that eases the
growing pains of stronger patent regimes in developing
countries.' Argentina was in fact "one of the first developing
46 See id at 289 (discussing the possibility of a new matrix for litigation).
47 See id.
48 See id.
" See id. Dependent patents are granted to improvements of existing
patented inventions. Producing the invention of the dependent patent wil
generally infringe the original patent unless the original patent grants a license.
Thus, the compulsory license encourages the development of improvements by
third-party inventors who would otherwise be unable to practice their
invention. Compulsory licenses for dependent patents make sense especially
when the original patent contributes very little value as compared to the
improvement. They encourage inventive rivalry, productive licensing
agreement, and, above all, practice of the dependent invention. See Gianna
Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the
Reality, 33 IDEA, 349, 364-67 (1993).
50 See Sherwood, supra note 21, at 289.
5' Bilateral agreements are more likely to cause resentment, especially
when one country tries to dictate another country's statutory regime.
Multilateral agreements, however, are subject to deadlock and other collective
action problems. See Lewis, supra note 25, at 853-54.
5 WTO member nations en joy a relatively liberal and organized trade
regime, a means of dispute resoution, and the possibility of most favored
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nations to codify... TRIPS."5 3
Pablo Challu, the executive director of CILFA, the Argentine
Association of Pharmaceutical Laboratories, asserts that
Argentina has gone above and beyond what TRIPS requires.
CILFA maintains that Argentina has already reduced the
permitted ten-year transition period to five years in a show of
good will. 4 It further argues that TRIPS permits parallel
imports,5 and authorizes compulsory licenses if "the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization of the right holder
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such
efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of
time.""
Argentina permits a generic manufacturer to rely on safety
tests conducted by another drug company to obtain public health
approval."7  "Under U.S. law, . . . only the company that
conducted the safety tests is permitted to use the test data" for a
nation trading status, among other benefits. See generally Agreement
Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 13
(1994).
" Argentina's CILFA Slams U.S. Trade Sanctions, MARKETLETTER, May 5,
1997, available in 1997 WL 10361935; see also Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods,
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUARY ROUND
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
s See Argentina Takes Issue with PhRMA over Sanctions Threat,
PHARMACEUTICAL BUS. NEWS, Mar. 13, 1996, at 14 [hereinafterPhRMA].
" See id. Parallel imports, commonly known as "gray market goods," are
lawfully made products not intended to be distributed in the exporting
country. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of rights, once the right holder
produces the protected good and it enters into the stream of commerce, the
right holder has exhausted the right and is no longer able to prevent further
distribution of the good. See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 36, at 8 10-11.
Hicks & Holbein imply that TRIPS forbids member nations to allow
exhaustion of rights. Cf id. at 811 ("[F]or the purpose of dispute settlement
under the agreement, member nations are not to invoke provisions to address
the issue of exhaustion of rights."). For a different view, see Correa, supra
note 29, at 330 ("Article 6 of the Agreement, which implicitly allows parties to
provide for the exhaustion of intellectual property rights, subject to the
national and most-favoured-nation treatment. ).
s6 PbRMA, supra note 54, at 14. CILFA did not address concerns about
data confidentiality protection in this pre-December 1996 statement. See id.
17 See An Unhealthy Trade Policy, supra note 3, at 6.
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five-year period." The recent sanctions are aimed at this lack of
protection for safety data, which is required by TRIPS under a
strict interpretation of unfair commercial use. 9 Much of the
developing world does not read TRIPS as strictly as does the U.S.
drug industry, and questions the assumption of TRIPS data
confidentiality protections.' TRIPS Article 39, paragraph 3 states
that data shall be protected against unfair commercial use.61
Argentine Articles 4 and 11 of Law 24,766 protect test data only
in cases of dishonest commercial practices, which are narrowly
defined. 2 No protection is granted to data which becomes public
following publication of any protected data in scientific and
academic circles.3
Challu believes the United States, not Argentina, violates
international treaties." According to Challu, the unilateral trade
sanctions aimed at meeting U.S. Trade Representative demands,
not TRIPS demands, clearly reek of "economic imperialism." 65
He believes that this conflict would be resolved in an official
discussion at the WTO if there were any merit to the U.S.
accusations.66
2.2.2. Regional TradeAgreements
TRIPS is already seen as a victory for the intellectual property
interests of developed countries.6 ' The United States, however,
pushes to achieve even higher levels of protection for especially
troubling countries like Argentina. The United States
successfully negotiated higher-than-TRIPS levels of patent
protection with Canada and Mexico under NAETA.68




61 See Sherwood, supra note 21, at 289.
62 See id.
63 See id.
4 See Washington Imposes Trade Sanctions, S. Am. REp., Feb. 1, 1997.
65 Id.
6 See id.
67 See An Unhealtby Trade Policy, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that TRIPS
requires Argentina to adopt "U.S.-style patent laws").
61 See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1077.
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standards of intellectual property protection.69 MERCOSUR
nations continue to wrestle with intellectual property standards
but have yet to resolve differences. For example, Argentina does
not provide for pipeline protection under its new patent law.7"
This issue sparked a hot trade debate with Brazil, which provided
for pipeline protection only after succumbing to the threat of
U.S. sanctions.71  All MERCOSUR countries are TRIPS
signatories and offer at least this level of protection, assuming
TRIPS compliance.' Developed nations are pushing NAFTA as
a model for MERCOSUR to implement stronger patent
protection. Regional agreements can achieve stronger protection
at a faster pace than multilateral treaties, but MERCOSUR
nations have thus far rejected alleged advantages of integrating
their patent protection standards.73  MERCOSUR, unlike
NAFTA, has no developed member nation which insists on a
high level of intellectual property protection for all member
nations. The United States plans to use the FTAA to foster
greater-than-TRIPS levels of intellectual property protection with
MERCOSUR and other Latin American nations.74
2.3. Administrative and Enforcement Problems
The specifics of implementing patent protection began
awkwardly in Argentina, but will improve if the political climate
warms to stronger protection. Application processing delays in
the 1992-renovated patent and trademark office routinely
frustrate prospective patentees.7 5 A new computer system and
newly-trained patent examiners yield Argentina seven of ten
administrative "points" under Robert Sherwood's rating
69 See Tancer & Tancer, supra note 25.
70 See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 36, at 812.
71 See id.
72 See id.
' See Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the North
American Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case of Regional Trade Regulation,
8 AM. U. J. INT'LL. &POL'Y 817, 824 (1993).
4 See Conferences, supra note 21, at 393; Philip Peters, Opinion, Why Latin
America Matters to California, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 26, 1997 at
B5, B9 ("The incentives will change dramatically when Washington returns to
trade talks, and Argentina will have to meet high standards of intellectual
property protection in order to join the FTAA.").
' See Sherwood, supra note 21, at 288.
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scheme.76
Once a patent is granted, there is no guarantee that the
Argentine government will grant relief against infringers even
under the new patent laws. Some estimates put the "piracy" rate
of drugs at about twenty-five percent,77 but until the complexities
of the new laws are ironed out, the definition of "piracy" itself is
open to administrative interpretation. Argentina's drug copy
industry operates legally until product protection begins in
2000.78
Enforcement itself brings no guarantee that piracy will end.
Despite raids, the Chinese piracy rate remained above 95% in
1996.79 Without prison sentences, fines, and the destruction of
imitation products, piracy is interrupted, not deterred."0
Comprehensive patent protection absolutely depends on efficient
administration and judicial cooperation.
2.4. Judicial Antagonism Toward Patent Protection
Legislation requires a competent and willing judiciary if it is
to be meaningfully enforced. Judges wield exceptional authority
in patent cases because they apply a relatively simple statutor
law to a set of extraordinarily complex factual circumstances.'
Robert Sherwood gives Argentina only four of twenty-five
possible points for judicial enforcement of intellectual property. 2
76 See id.
'7 See Health Care in the Developing World, supra note 12. "Piracy" itself is
a term adopted by PhRMA to frame intellectual property rights as absolute
rights in a moral drama. See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1086-89.
78 See Invention Patents and Utility Models Act, Law No. 24, 481, VIII,
reporter 100, in Argentine Patent Act, supra note 22, at Argentina-9.19 ("Until
such date none of the articles contained in this Act laying down the
patentability of inventions of pharmaceuticals shall be in effect.").
'9 See Argentina, China, Russia Accountfor $1B+ in Software Piracy-Related
Trade Losses, EDP WKLY., Feb. 24, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Piracy-Related Trade];
see, e.g., Lois W. Abraham, The Uphill Battle against Software Piracy Abroad (and
at Home), in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 449,
462 (1996).
80 See Piracy-Related Trade, supra note 79, at 1 (statement of Mark
Traphagen, vice president and counsel of Software Publishers Association).
"1 See Hon. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or
JudicialActivism?, 42AM. U. L. REv. 683, 685 (1993).
82 See Sherwood, supra note 21, at 288.
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He finds that judges are not held in high regard despite strong
educational backgrounds. 83 One Gallup Poll found, for example,
that only thirteen percent of the Argentine public has confidence
in the administration of justice.84
Although corruption is widely suspected," the issue is getting
increasing media attention and corruption cases decreased
dramatically following privatization of many state enterprises
after 1989.86 While the court routinely hears trademark cases,
patent litigation is almost unknown." Judges are unfamiliar with
patent law and grant only nominal statutory penalties for patent
infringement, if any at all.8
An Argentine criminal appellate court recently shocked the
intellectual property community when it overturned a 1995
infringement decision in favor of Autodesk, a U.S. business
software company.' The court decided that computer programs
are not protected by Argentine copyright law, despite a 1994
presidential decree that data bases and computer programs were
protected by copyright." The Supreme Court recently affirmed,
ruling that it is not illegal to copy computer programs?9
Argentine courts have long disfavored recognizing strong
patent rights. The Supreme Court of Argentina ruled that, in the
unusual case where only one chemical process may produce a
specific pharmaceutical product, the patent for such a process was
tantamount to a prohibited product patent and thus
unenforceable.9 Because the plaintiff carries the burden to prove
that the defendant used the patented process, the copiers nearly
83 See id,
84 See Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in
Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 168 n.5 (1995).
" See Sherwood, supra note 21, at 288.
86 See Argentina: Investment Climate Statement for 1997, supra note 41.
87 See Sherwood, supra note 21, at 288.
88 See id.
89 See Abraham, supra note 79, at 460, 460 n.ii; Piracy Related Trade, supra
note 79, at 1.
90 See Abraham, supra note 79, at 460 n.ii.
91 See Ken Warn, Buenos Aires Seeks to Ease Software Fears, FiN. TIMEs, Feb.
9, 1998, at 4.
92 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The
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always win.'
Argentine courts, however, do not generally assert positions
contrary to those of a strong executive branch.94 The Supreme
Court commonly sides with the executive in any case in which
the administration has a high stake in the outcome.9 ' Given
Menem's inclination to accede to U.S. demands for higher
intellectual property protection, the courts may look more
favorably upon judicial enforcement of the 1996 law. This
deference to political pressure, however, affects the credibility of
the entire judiciary. 96
2.5. Executive and Legislative Conflict over Patent Legislation
President Menem exemplifies the strong executive who rules a
young democracy that succeeds a dictatorship. 9 Argentina's dark
period of military rule ended in 1983, when Raul Alfonsin was
elected.98 Carlos Menem stepped into power in 1989, facing grave
hyperinflation.99 Although Menem has largely turned the
economy around, Professor Alejandro Garro notes that Menem
has sidestepped Congress and ruled the country by presidential
decree to force his economic program upon Argentina."
Argentina has an under-developed sense of the separation of
powers which inhere in the ideal of democratic decentralization
"' See id. TRIPS Art. 38, however, purports to reverse the burden of proof
in civil litigation involving process patents. See Correa, supra note 29, at 333.
Correa describes the difficulty of coming to a compromise between developed
and developing nations for this issue. See id. He believes that "[t]he established
reversal should only operate if and when the process invention is clearly and
completely described, since this is a condition for any potential infringer to
know to what extent his acts are legitimate or not." Id.
9 See Garro, supra note 14, at 76.
s See id. at 74, 76 (noting that President Menem increased the membership
of the Supreme Court from five to nine justices for purely political reasons).
96 See id. at 76-77.
9 See Garro, supra note 14, at 2.
9' See id. at 7 ("From 1976 to 1983, Argentina lived one of the darkest
periods of its history, when a military regime became an agent of terror by
conducting a 'dirty war' resulting in the disappearance, torture, and murder of
thousands of people.").
9 See id. at 8.
100 See id.
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of power.1"' Menem freely issues "presidential decrees" when he
disagrees with legislation from Congress, as he did with the 1995
patent legislation. 2 These decrees empower him to "correct" the
legislation to an unascertainable degree.
The United States treads on thin democratic ice when it
encourages Menem to disrespect the Argentine Congress and
force stronger intellectual property protection upon Argentina.
The U.S. government, Menem's administration, and foreign drug
companies are in a "tug-of-war" with the Argentine Congress and
domestic drug companies. 3 Menem's chief of staff blames
Congress for bringing on U.S. sanctions: "[ift was parliament,
not government, that passed this law."" Government does not,
in his eyes, include Congress. The Argentine Congress does exert
some power to legislate, but this power is not respected by either
Menem's administration or the U.S. government, especially for
patent legislation.
Garro believes it is very important to encourage a self-
restrained president in Argentina to avoid the abuses of a system
without checks and balances on power.0 5 The United States
should respect Argentina's sovereignty to decide its patent laws so
as to not force Menem to continue to encroach upon the
independent powers of Congress and the judiciary.
3. FITTING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY INTO THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY EQUATION
3.1. How Much Intellectual Property Protection is Enough?
The public benefits from a system of patents which
encourages and rewards innovation. A patent regime must
balance this benefit with the detriment to the public of
"01 See id. at 85-87. ("Argentine federalism... was built upon a somewhat
artificial redistribution of powers of a previously unitary State among its newly
created provinces.").
102 See, e.g., Garro, supra note 14, at 8, 83 (discussing the transformation of
the President's regulatory power into legislative power by Argentine decrees).
103 See Lewis, supra note 25, at 857.
104 See Paula L. Green, Range of Argentine Exports Threatened; Affected
Goods Should Be Known by March, J. coM., Jan. 17, 1997, at 3A.
103 See Garro, supra note 14, at 102.
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monopolistic pricing."6 The optimal length of patent life is a
function of market demand and technological factors."0 7 Thus,
national interests, not merely principles, define optimal patent
protection. 108 Nation states pragmatically change their patent
laws to accommodate interests which vary from country to
country.109 Governments grant statutory patent rights designed
to maximize inventive activity for the public, not natural patent
rights aimed at personally rewarding inventors.110 The balance of
the equation measuring the benefits of promoting inventive
activity versus the detriment of a monopoly should be allowed to
shift to recognize unique valuation of many variables."1
The question of how much protection is enough, of course,
depends on who asks the question. Sherwood's point system
requires a score of at least 50 to 60 out of 100 to adequately
promote lower levels of technological activity. 112 A score of
about 60 to 70 will probably stimulate higher levels of
technological activity.1 Argentina's score of 39 appears dismal
under this system. Sherwood gives TRIPS a '55' rating and
NAFTA a '68'."'
Developed countries can liberally grant long and various
monopoly patent powers because consumers expect innovation
1 Carlos Correa says that "[n]ational laws should establish equilibrium
between the interests of holders of intellectual property rights and the public,
and must above all balance protection of technology on one hand, with its
transfer and diffusion on the other." Gustavo Capdevila, Trade: Intellectual
Property Rights and the Developing South, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 8, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 13257028.
'0' See Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda's
Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History,
in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 19,
at 36.
108 See id at 56.
109 See id
110 See, e.g., "Royalties Not Monopolies" says ALIFAR, MARKETLETTER, June
14, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2827949 (arguing for a system of automatic
royalty collection rather than patent monopolies to prevent excessively
rewarding innovators at the expense of other national priorities).
m See id
1 See Sherwood, supra note 21, at 353.
1 See id. at 353.
14 See id. at 362, 366.
111719981
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa._[ Int'l Econ. L.
and are more likely to be able to pay for it." 5 For example, A
broadly represents public benefits, traditionally the promotion of
inventive activity, the development and commercial use of the
inventive activity, and disclosure to the public. " 6 Where M is the
price of granting a monopoly:1
7
A>M
The price of a monopoly may be substantial, however, even
for industrialized nations that produce a lot of innovation.
President Clinton's campaign to reform national health care in
the early 1990s was driven in part by excessive prices of the
monopolistic system.'18 Jose Carlos Magalhaes of ALANAC, the
Brazilian national pharmaceutical association, says that the
United States "is now addressing the realities of monopolistic
patents which result in high drug prices and high health care
costs, and they want to impose the same system on Third World
countries."" 9 By charging monopolistic prices to less developed
nations, U.S. companies can hope to recoup some of the losses
they experience in their own price-dependent, patent-
monopolized market. 2 ° In effect, poorer countries subsidize the
burden of protecting the intellectual property of wealthier
countries.' Carlos Correa, an international intellectual property
115 Americans "demand and receive the most advanced healthcare in the
world." Mossin~hoff notes that most products are cheaper in developing or
newly industrialized countries than in the United States. See Mossinghoff
Testimony, supra note 24.
"" See David B. Audretsch, Intellectual Property Rights: New Research
Directions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL COMPETITION:
TOWARDS A NEW SYNTHESIS, at 41 (Horst Albach & Stephanie Rosenkranz
eds., 1995) (discussing the relative merits of patent protection systems).
117 Strictly speaking, a patent does not confer a monopoly. It confers only
the right to exclude the public from practicing the patented invention during
the patent term.
11 "Royalties Not Monopolies" Says ALIFAR, supra note 110.
119 See id.
120 The TRIPS agreement is expected to bring in $5 billion more to
American pharmaceutical companies alone. See Intellectual Property... Is Theft,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1994, at 72.
12 Carlos Correa accuses the U.S. drug industry of exporting"a system
that has failed in its own country to ensure access to medicines at reasonable
prices for all Americans." Patents: Private Rights and Public Interests,
MARKETLETrER, Nov. 2, 1992, available'in 1992 WL 2794546.
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expert from the University of Buenos Aires, urges the United
States to refrain from exporting its patent system to countries
where the average income is only a fraction of the average U.S.
income. 22
The variables M and A reflect shifting valuation preferences.
The equation for maximal intellectual property protection in
developing nations thus may have a very different balance than
what is seen above for developed nations. A, the public benefits,
lose importance when a nation produces little innovation itself.
M, the price of the monopoly, becomes very politically and
economically costly when it threatens a strong local copy-
industry. Drugs may not even sell at monopoly prices if most
people cannot afford them. A nation may choose to forego a
pharmaceutical patent policy altogether and adopt a policy of
disseminating a core group of the most essential drugs at lowprices. 12
Different variables enter the equation for developing countries
who wish to adjust their intellectual property laws to maximize
direct foreign investment, here represented as B. Developing
nations may also be concerned about variable C, pleasing a
coercive nation. New legal institutions themselves cost a
considerable amount to create and maintain, here represented as
variable D. 24 Thus, when a strong patent regime is disfavored:
A+B+C<M+D
The variables on the left side of the equation represent the
benefits to a developing nation of a strong intellectual property
regime. The variables on the right side reflect the cost of such a
regime. Patent legislation reflects the inclusion and valuation of
various factors in this equation. In Argentina, where President
Menem highly values variable C, pleasing the United States, the
balance tips toward granting more patent protection when
Menem can influence legislation." Congress, however, is more
122 See id.
"2 See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1121.
124 See Walter G. Park & Juan Carlos Ginarte, Intellectual Property Rights
and Economic Growth, CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y, July 1997, at 51-61
(discussing the benefits of increased intellectual property protection).
125 See, e.g., Nathaniel C. Nash, Gore Sees Privatization of Global Data
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directly under the political influence of local interests who have
the most to lose under strong patent protection. 126 Pablo Challu
of the Argentine drug industry proposes a system of what he calls
"automatic" licenses, which provide multinational
pharmaceutical companies with the same amount of money that
they could obtain from monopolistic patents."V This respects the
right to provide an incentive to innovate, while at the same time
respects the rights of Latin American countries to develop their
national industries, the rights of their citizens to consume
affordable medication, and additionally allows the region's
governments to establish health care systems.
128
The influence and valuation of variable C, foreign coercion,
skews the intellectual property equation toward granting more
patent protection than a developing nation would choose to do
by itself. Section 3.2. discusses the positive value of creating a
system of uniform, international, intellectual property protection.
The United States and other developed nations may have
legitimate reasons to coerce Argentina into passing laws that it
would not otherwise pass. Section 3.3. explores the independence
that Argentina has demonstrated in the face of strong coercion.
3.2. The Case for Strong Intellectual Property Protection in
Argentina
3.2.1. Foreign Investment
U.S. coercion to upgrade foreign intellectual property
protection paternalistically promises to improve foreign
investment prospects.'29 Argentina may in fact be losing foreign
Links, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1994, at D2.
126 Domingo Cavallo, once Minister of Economy in Argentina, accused
Congress of taking bribes when it approved "corrective" Bill 25,572 in July
and September 1995. PhRMA found the overall bill inadequate. See The Path
to Patent Law as Taken by Argentina, supra note 1.
127 See "Royalties Not Monopolies" Says ALIFAR, supra note 110.
128 See id.
129 One recent quantitative study found that intellectual property rights
indirectly stimulate the accumulation of factor inputs like research and
development and physical capital. Intellectual property rights do not have any
direct role, however, in explaining international variations in growth. See Park
& Ginarte, supra note 124, at 60.
Foreign investment increases in Argentina are attributable to its removal of
1120 [19:4
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investment because of its low level of patent protection. Its
pharmaceutical market dropped 2% in 1995 when Brazil adopted
a stronger intellectual property law and dominated the Latin
American pharmaceutical market.13  A questionnaire by
economist Edwin Mansfield studied the responses of ninety-four
U.S. firms in six manufacturing industries. It indicated that
intellectual property rights could be an important factor in those




Developed nations also suggest that patented medicines will
become more widely available when patent protection increases
for pharmaceuticals.132 However, developing countries often
argue that they deserve to treat health knowledge as part of the
public domain for the benefit of all.13  The U.S. drug industry
rejects giving away technological rights as a development tool.
Rather, it finds that the social value of pharmaceuticals presents
an especially strong case in favor of patent protection.1 34 Because
drugs are so expensive to produce, they will not be produced at
all if no means exist to recoup development costs through a
tariff and non-tariff barriers and tax concessions. In April 1991 Argentina
launched a successful attempt to curb hyperinflation, restore fiscal balance, and
stabilize prices. See Economic Developments Outside the OECD, OECD ECON.
OUTLOOK, Dec. 1991, at 60.
13' See Latin America: Brazil is Booming, Argentina and the Rest Lag Behind,
supra note 11.
131 See Finance: Foreign Investment May Be Related To Patent Protection,
Inter Press Service, Mar. 15, 1994.
13 See Drug Makers Seek Action on Argentina, CHEMICAL MARKET REP.,
Apr. 28, 1997, at 14. CAEME, the representative body of Argentina's
multinational pharmaceutical industry, reports that new patented medical
products account for only 1% of those sold in the country and says that
stronger patent protection would increase the number of medicines available in
Argentina. See Argentine Senate Group Against Patents Bill, MARKETLETTER,
Jan. 10, 1994.
1 See generally Julian-Arnold, supra note 49, at 356.
134 Twelve years and $359 million dollars are required, on average, to
discover and develop a new drug. See Mossinghoff Testimony, supra note 24.
The pharmaceutical industry is unique in its need for incentives to undertake
costly research and development activities. See Wendy W. Yang, Note, Patent
Policy and Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory Exclusion From
Patentability, 1 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 5, 54 n.156 (1995).
1121
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
limited monopoly patent grant.135
3.2.3. Encourage Domestic Activity
In addition to increasing the availability of existing patented
medicines, patent laws often encourage domestic research activity.
Argentina's relatively sophisticated domestic industry is well-
poised to take advantage of stronger patent protection. For
instance, Gador, a wholly Argentine-owned drug company,
developed a test for Chagas' disease, a disorder prevalent in Latin
America.136 The timing of this development coincided with
legislative activity moving toward greater patent protection. 3
Significantly, Gador lacked funding to further the research to
develop a vaccine for Chagas'.3 8 Had a system with a potential
monopoly reward been in place, arguably development of a
vaccine would now be well under way.'39 The private sector will
be increasingly responsible for contributing to the technological
base as Argentina becomes increasingly privatized."4 This will
strengthen the call for patent protection to protect private
developments from unfair competition.
3.2.4. Eliminate Compulsory Licenses
Compulsory licenses may not reward innovation enough to
make continued aggressive drug research worthwhile for
developed countries, whose industries increasingly rely on the
profitability of foreign drug markets. 41  Furthermore,
compulsory licenses encourage copy-industries which play a game
of perpetual catch-up and do not contribute to an original
research base." Even Robert Weissman, who defends
compulsory licenses, concedes that the promise of patent
135 See id.
136 See MacDonald, supra note 10, at 21.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 Local companies frequently lack funding to perform research in
Argentina, even when the skills and motivation are present. See id.
" See id. at 78 (forecasting privatization, especially in the agricultural
sector).
141 See Julian-Arnold, supra note 49, at 357; Mossinghoff, supra note 92, at
308.
142 See Julian-Arnold, supra note 49, at 360.
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monopolies probably encourages some research that would not
otherwise take place under a liberal compulsory license regime.143
3.2.5. Data Confidentiality
Data confidentiality promotes the submission of important
testing data for new pharmaceuticals that is critical for public
health safety.'" Where there is great incentive to defraud the
public health approval agency with misleading test data, the
agency should encourage full and open disclosure with the
promise of protection.'45 Both NAFTA and the United States
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") require a "five year hold
provision" on test data. 46 Although test data is outside the scope
of patent protection, the expense of generating proprietary data
could justify this short period of monopoly rights for its use. 47
3.2.6. Protectionism
Economic protectionism arguably explains Argentine
resistance to strong patent protection. The Argentine copy-
industry does not deserve to reap the same profits as the
companies who invest enormous amounts of research to develop
drugs. 4 Some copied drugs are even more expensive than
patented equivalents. The Argentine drug industry in
143 See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1122.
114 See, e.g., E. Patrick McGuire, The Underreporting of Product-Related
Injuries, 5 PRODUCT LIABIITY LAW AND STRATEGY 4 (1997) (finding endemic
underreporting of important drug testing information to the FDA).
145 See id.
146 See Eileen McMahon, NAFTA and the Biotechnology Industry, 33 CAL.
W. L. REv. 31, 46 (1996).
147 See Argentina: "Flagship for World Drug Patent Piracy," MARKET-
LETTER, Jan. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7972261; see also James T.
O'Reilly, Knowledge is Power: Legislative Control of Drug Industry Trade Secrets,
54 U. GIN. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1985).
148 Drug pirates are not "Robin Hoods" - they make handsome profits.
Local firms are likely to go out of business as stronger patent rules come into
force. See Intellectual Property... Is Theft, supra note 120, at 72.
149 See Tancer & Tancer, supra note 25. Multinational drug companies say
that Argentine imitators charge as much as 30% more for the final product
than multinational manufacturers, representing an enormous profit because
they did not incur the research and development costs of the drugs. See Nash,
supra note 18, at D3; see also Health Care in the Developing World, supra note 12
(citing multinational drug companies findings' that pirated products are priced
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particular has proven itself more aggressive in exploiting weak
patent laws than local firms in other industries.' Its exporting
activities demonstrate that its activity is not just for the public
benefit of making these products available to Argentines.' As
the world moves toward economic globalization, it is important
to recognize the rights of national sovereignty only to the extent
that national laws do not threaten free trade with selfish
protectionism.1
2
3.2.7 Drug Prices Not Unreasonable
Patent protection rarely results in unmanageably high drug
prices. Ninety percent of essential drugs are not covered by U.S.
patents.' One study found that "drug prices in different
countries tend to be set at the highest level the traffic will bear." 1"4
Drug prices are likely to decrease in the developing world as
managed health care pressures doctors to prescribe competitive
generic drugs.' The developed world has already observed this
trend of lower drug prices. " Private health care groups are also
15-30% higher than brand-name products).
150 See Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use ofIntellectual Property: Effects on
Investment Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 126.
I" Argentine drug makers sell their products throughout South America.
See Helene Cooper, Argentina Faces Sanctions by U.S. Over Drug Patents, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 16, 1997, at All.
1 The United States, for example, values the sovereignty of its states and
their ability to find diverse solutions to similar problems. The Commerce
Clause, however, enables the Court to strike down protectionist state
provisions which unfairly burden interstate commerce. f U.S. CONST. art. I,
S 8, c. 3. Intellectual property received generous federal treatment early on in
part because it was particularly vulnerable to protectionist concerns. Cf. U.S.
CONST. art. I, S 8, cf 8.
15 See Julian-Arnold, supra note 49, at 361.
154 Gereffi, supra note 20, at 194.
155 IMS International predicts that the next five years will see the growth
of managed health care in Latin America, particularly in Argentina and Brazil.
Private health insurance schemes are most advanced in Argentina with the
deregulation of Obras Sociales (mutuales) which allows more competitive
choice between private health schemes. These organizations are also able to
lobby for lower drug prices. See Price Hikes Drive Latin America's Pharma
Market, MARKETLETTER, June 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10362483.
156 Gerald Mossinghoff of PhRMA finds that 1990s healthcare reform has
caused a dramatic slowing in drug-price increases, citing the increased use of
generics. The Congressional Budget Office reports that "[d]rugs losing their
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able to pressure government and the drug industry to lower drug
prices. l As expensive as drugs may seem, they are in fact the
most cost-effective form of health care because they keep patients
out of hospitals and on the job.'58
Even if drug prices were too high for most, this issue should
arguably be addressed by social welfare or national health policy,
not by an attack on patent rights."5 9 Intellectual property rights
merely guarantee that inventive pharmaceutical activity will be
encouraged and any results will be disseminated to the public.
Few would argue, for example, that AZT should never have been
produced because it is currently too expensive for most HIV-
positive patients."6 The drug would not exist at all but for the
patent policy. The issue of access to drugs presents different
policy questions which may be answered by other free market
exceptions.
3.2.8. Quality Assurance
Patent rights for drugs provide the side benefit of more
quality control assurance. Copied products may be of suspect
quality. 6 Drug companies will be more likely to protect their
knowledge under a shroud of secrecy when they cannot receive
adequate data protection to operate openly.'62 If generic
patents between 1992 and 2000 include 54 of the most popular drugs."
Mossinghoff Testimony, supra note 24.
157 The IMS predicts that structural changes in the health care sector will
give managed care providers greater purchasing power and provide more
competition and thus lower drug prices. It also predicts that the use of generics
will increase from 20% to 50%. See Latin America: Brazil is Boomin Argentina
and the Rest Lag Behind, supra note 11.
158 See Mossinghoff Testimony, supra note 24.
159 See generally Robert N. Swidler, Medical Innovations and Ethics: A State
Government Perspective, 57 ALB. L. REV. 655, 656 (1994) (noting state's
regulatory role as a subsequent step to state's role in promotion of public
health through innovation).
160 See, e.g., Yang, supra note 134, at 34.
161 Rafael Alonso, representing the multinational companies, says that
.quality control among Argentine companies is lax, which poses a potential
health risk to the public." Nash, supra note 18, at D3. Some drugs that are
patented and tested by American companies are on the shelves of Argentine
pharmacies even before the American manufacturer has approval to sell the
drug in the United States. See id.; see also Julian-Arnold, supra note 49, at 362
(discussing the welfare and safety concerns of consumers).
" See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 25, at 854-55 (discussing ways to limit
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producers operate without important production and testing
information, the potential for lower quality and even dangerous
products are exacerbated.163
3.2.9. Decreased Transaction Costs
The United States of course has more selfish reasons for
wanting greater protection abroad.1" Aside from benefiting
domestic mercantile interests, harmonization of intellectual
property laws decreases transaction costs."6 ' Achieving patent
protection in many foreign countries is administratively costly
enough without the required research into how best to achieve
protection in countries with unique, narrowly-tailored
intellectual property laws. 66 The transaction costs associated
with granting compulsory licenses may be especially high because
Argentina's compulsory licensing provisions require extensive
fact-finding to determine if a license may be fairly granted under
Argentina's new controversial patent law. Further research
would be needed to determine whether a compulsory licensing
provision complies with TRIPS.
disclosure of commercially valuable patent rights).
163 See generally O'Reilly, supra note 147, at 21-24 (discussing the
information differential between generic manufacturers and patent owner
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and uncertain standards for generic
manufacturer defen ants in products liability actions).
164 Alan Holmer, president of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers Association ("PhRMA"), says that "pharmaceutical patent
piracy in Argentina hurts the US trade balance, costs US jobs and reduces the
amount of money companies can spend to find new medicines." Drug Makers
Seek Action on Argentina, supra note 132, at 14.
165 Cf Robert M. Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System
Makes Sense for the World, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 69 (discussing the difficulty of making
investment and research decisions in a world without congruent patent laws).
166 See, e.g., Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now-The Case for Patent
Harmonization, 20 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 291, 321 (1995) (discussing
reduced transaction costs under harmonized patent laws).
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3.3. The Case for Allowing Argentina to Develop Its Own
Patent Regime
3.3.1. Sovereignty
Argentina is entitled to design patent laws suited to its
domestic interests. 1 7 Its expression of this national sovereignty is
critical to provide a unique voice in what should be an
international debate on intellectual property rights.16 The U.S.
drug industry has aggressively silenced voices that suggested levels
of patent protection below U.S. standards.169 For example,
members of ALIFAR, the Latin American Pharmaceutical
Association, were not even invited to participate on panels in the
recent Intellectual Property Conference of the Americas." The
trend toward increased harmonization of intellectual property
rights is not the natural result of economic globalization.1
7 '
Rather, it is a one-sided, concerted effort of the drug industry to
ignore multilateral interests and approaches for its narrow
mercantile interests. t Ironically, the patent right itself is an
exception to the free-market principles that the industry
otherwise presses on developing countries to market its
167 Michael Davis, a patent law expert from the Cleveland Marshall
College of Law, told members of a conference of the Latin American
Association of National Pharmaceutical Industries (ALIFAR) that "[e]ach
country has the right to tailor its patent laws to its domestic needs." U.S. and
Canadian Experts Oppose U.S. Double Standard in Access to Heath Care,
Recommend Compulsory Licensing, PR Newswire, May 14, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
168 Pablo Challu, executive director of Argentina's drugmakers association,
CILFA, claims that this debate is not about intellectual property rights, but
about "PhRMA's interest in obtaining unlimited profits without the
inconvenience of legitimate competition. They will use any tool and any
government to obtain more protection for their already overly protected
industry." Argentina's CILFA Slams U.S. Trade Sanctions, supra note 53.
169 See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1075.
170 See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Excludes Latin American
Pharmaceutical Representatives from L.A. Conference, PR Newswire, July 17,
1996.
171 See Argentina's CILFA Slams U.S. Trade Sanctions, supra note 53.
(discussing the enormous benefits enjoyed by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
under the current TRIPS regime).
172 See id.
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In a further irony, the United States frustrates the democratic
will of the very young democracy of Argentina and creates
political instability by forcing repeated confrontations between a
strong executive and Congress. 4 Argentina contributes valuable
and valid alternatives to the strict regime urged by the United
States. Its provision for compulsory licenses for dependent
patents, for example, is a creative way to "foster technical
progress and should not be overlooked." 
175
3.3.2. Data Confidentiality Protection
TRIPS, already a product of asymmetric negotiations
favorable to the United States,1 6 does not satisfy U.S. drug
industry demands for patent protection." The drug industry
continues to press for stronger international agreements and
interprets those agreements to exclude valid exceptions that are
useful for developing countries. 18  Test data confidentiality
requirements create an exclusive right outside of usual patentable
matter for the inventors. 19  The Center for the Study of
Responsive Law ("CSRL") praises Argentina's position on data
confidentiality as "the one that best promotes public health
173 See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1069 (noting that patents are a restriction
in the trade of goods).
7 See USA Urged to Withdraw Action Against Argentina, MARKETLETrER,
Feb. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7972509 (noting that Ralph Nader's letter
to President Clinton "[a]lso notes the 'irony' that while the USA is criticized
at home for failing to impose trade sanctions on countries that limit dissent,
the USTR is 'seeking to impose trade sanctions in an effort to limit dissent in
newly democratically-inclined Argentina'").
171 See Julian-Arnold, supra note 49, at 364 (commenting that dependent
parties in general may serve to foster technical progress and should not be
overlooked).
176 Carlos Correa described TREPS as "a great victory by industrialized
countries and their lobbying groups." Capdevila, supra note 106.
17 "Special 301" provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended)
authorize the U.S. Trade Representative to impose sanctions even on nations
which fully comply with TRIPS obligations. See FACT SHEETS, "Special
301" on Intellectual Property Rights and 1996 Title VII Decisions (visited Oct. 5,
1998) <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/special/factsheets.html.>.
178 See generally Weissman, supra note 9, at 1070.




interests."18 The CSRL criticizes U.S. sanctions as "backdoor
attempts to convey private monopoly power for drugs that do
not qualify for patent protection."" For example, Taxol, a
cancer drug, was discovered by the National Cancer Institute
("NCI") with government funding.' The NCI gave exclusive
rights to its test data to Bristol-Myers Squibb."' Any company
wishing to produce the drug must wait five years or present
redundant scientific evidence that Taxol is safe and effective, even
though the drug does not qualify for patent protection. Bristol-
Myers Squibb expected Taxol sales to exceed $1 billion in 1997
because of its ability to shut competition out under the U.S
protection.'84 Argentina's decision not to extend protection to
data confidentiality is rational in such a situation, where there is
little positive social value in requiring duplicative drug testing.
Rewarding non-innovators with a monopoly right does not
stimulate innovation.
The Taxol case illustrates a not uncommon phenomenon of
the private sector appropriating a monopoly from government-
funded research. Although the private sector makes large
investments in research and development, evidence suggests that
private ventures tend to be lower-risk attempts at less significant
therapeutic improvements.'
3.3.3. Exaggerated "Piracy" Claims
Besides demanding unfairly high levels of protection, the U.S.
drug industry exaggerates why these levels of protection are
needed. Complaints by the U.S. pharmaceutical companies that
they are losing millions of dollars to piracy'86 are overstated,





185 See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1093 n.135.
186 Piracy allegedly accounts for some $600 million in losses each year in
Argentina. See Foreign Firms to Invest Heavily in Brazilian Pharmaceutical
Patents, West's Legal News, Oct. 15, 1996,available in 1996 WL 587103. The
range of accusations varies from about $300 to $600 million dollars lost from
piracy. Cf Sims, supra note 32 (noting that losses could be as high as $300
million dollars).
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according to one expert, because "[o]ne cannot lose what one
never had.""'7 Many projected losses due to "piracy" come from
studies funded by the drug industry itself.188 The risk of imitation
inheres in business ventures with Argentina, which allows
compulsory licenses.89  To reap the benefit of trade with
Argentina, one must pay the price of less intellectual property
protection or make the best of your foreign investment with non-
patent alternatives.
3.3.4. Foreign Investment
The drug industry also overstates the importance of
intellectual property rights in its foreign investment decisions.
Intellectual property protection is only one factor in an
investment decision. Patent protection is rarely determinative,
especially for a country like Argentina that offers other trade
advantages19 and something approaching TRIPS level of patent
protection, beginning in 2000.'91 U.S. sanctions are merely
intended to sweeten the deal for the drug industry, which is
already making enough money in the Argentine market to make
its investment worthwhile. 192
The "modernization" theory, developed after World War II,
asserts that less developed societies should emulate the models of
developed nations for the growth and development of all
nations.193 Developing nations have since challenged this theory,
187 U.S. and Canadian Experts Oppose U.S. Double Standard in Access to
Health Care, Recommend Compulsory Licensing, supra note 167.
188 See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1085 (describing pharmaceutical industry
estimates that it had lost billions of dollars in sales annually).
189 Argentine drug companies assert that multinationals knew they were
entering a market with weak protection. For over a century, only process
patents were protected. Anibal Caprile, president of CILFA, says, "[w]e use a
different process than the original and arrive at the same final product, and that
is permitted by our laws." Caprile rejects the labels of "pirates" and "copiers."
Nash, U.S. Presses Argentina on Patents, supra note 18, at D3.
190 Argentina has successfully encouraged direct foreign investment in
other ways, giving tax concessions and policy adjustments, and deregulating
the Argentine economy and restructuring foreign external debt. See Economic
Developments outside the OECD, supra note 129, at 60.
191 See Argentine Patent Act, supra note 22.
192 See MacDonald, supra note 10, at 21.
193 See Gereffi, supra note 20, at 3-6.
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finding instead that they are relegated to dependent relationships
within a very hierarchical world order.194 A patent system simply
does not provide what is missing in developing countries, namely,
a science and technology infrastructure.'95  Stronger patent
protection does not necessarily attract more foreign investment,
according to one United Nations study. 196 Italy, for example, lost
money when it enacted strong patent laws because large
multinationals cornered the market and prevented competition. 9 '
In 1993, for example, Mexico, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan,
and Thailand all had strong foreign investment and economies
and weak patent laws.' 9  Brazil abolished patents for
pharmaceutical products in 1949 and for manufacturing processes
in 1969.199 Foreign investment there increased six-fold between
1971 and 1979 despite strong opposition to these weak laws."
194 See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamantha, Book Note, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995)
(reviewing ANTHONY CARTY, ed., LAW AND DEVELOPMENT VOL. 2, Legal
Cultures (1992), and SAMMY ADELMAN & ABDUL PALiWALA, eds., LAW AND
CRISES IN THE THIRD WORLD (1993)) (discussing the pessimism prompted by
the failure of developing countries to succeed under modernization theory).
195 See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1124.
196 See Pratap Chatterjee, Trade: Study Questions Benefits of Strong Patent
Laws, Inter Press Service, Sept. 11, 1993. Chatterjee cites those who say that
comparing patent protection and investment patterns is like comparing apples
and oranges. Patents are much more directly linked to both product prices and
foreign corporate profits. See id.
Similarly, an empirical study of post-1975 investment with regression
analysis found no significant relationship between patents and foreign direct
investment for less-developed countries. The study cited Brazil and Argentina
as examples where the absence of adequate protection for patents in
pharmaceuticals did not deter investment. See Belay Seyoum, The Impact of
Intellectual Property Rights on Foreign Direct Investment, 31 COLuM. J. WORLD
Bus. 50, 57 (1996).
"Investment decisions will continue to have more to do with national laws
on ownership, market size and the state of the domestic industry than with
intellectual-property protection." Intellectual Property... Is Theft, supra note
120, at 72. But see Parke & Ginarte, supra note 129, and accompanying text,
discussing a questionnaire study linking intellectual property as one factor for
prospective U.S. drug company investments abroad; see also Finance: Foreign
Investment May Be Related 'To Patent Protection, Inter Press Service, Mar. 15,
1994.





Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
The study concluded that third world countries may profit from
protecting local products with their patent laws rather than
foreign products.'01 ALIFAR blames unemployment and de-
industrialization on U.S. pressure on Latin American countries to
modernize their patent legislation. 22
Even if patent rights invite a greater presence of multinational
companies in Argentina, this presence does not guarantee an
improvement in the state of Argentine public health care. In
Canada, for example, five years after the Canadian government
introduced patent laws favorable to the United States, the average
cost of pharmaceutical drugs rose by fifty three percent. 3 The
chairman of the Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association says
that Canada's decision in 1992 to scrap its seventy-year-old
compulsory licensing of patents will cost Canada an extra $7
billion in health care by the year 2010.20
4
3.3.5. Strengthen Local Industry
The multinational drug industry is also infamous for
providing a "very inappropriate assortment of products" to third
world countries and ignoring diseases that are a national
priority.2" The U.S. industry generally develops and markets
nonessential drugs aimed at treating the ailments of the affluent. 6
A strong local industry is much more able to identify and serve
national health needs. Argentina has used its intellectual property
rights laws to develop a strong pharmaceutical sector which
contributes powerfully to its own national economy and the
global marketplace .2  The industry exerts considerable political
201 See id.
202 See ALIFAR: No Let-Up From US Patent Pressure, MARKETLETTER, July
14, 1997.
203 See Chatterjee, supra note 196.
24 See Uniyal, supra note 23. But see Owen Lippert, The Americas: Pirates
Plunder Patents; Will the Rule of Law Prevail?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1998, at
A15 (noting the success of Canada's increased patent protection, including an
actual decline in drug prices and an increase in research and development
spending).
205 Gereffi, supra note 20, at 200.
206 See Tancer & Tancer, supra note 25.
207 See Mark Ritchie ET AL., Intellectual Propey Rights and Biodiversity:
The Industrialization of Natural Resources and Traditional Knowledge, 11 ST.
JoHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 431, 434 (1996).
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power,"' owing much of its success to compulsory licensing
provisions. 9 In Argentina, unlike Brazil, the top pharmaceutical
companies are Argentine.210
3.3.6. Patent Policy Intertwined with Health Care Policy
Developing countries may properly be more concerned with
developing a policy of health care access than with assuring
monopolies to successful inventors, especially when those
inventors are predominantly foreign.1 Argentina and other
developing nations convinced the World Health Organization to
draft a resolution that would urge its 101 member nations to
loosen patent protections on drugs by ensuring that public health
rather than commercial interests have primacy in pharmaceutical
health policies.' Patent policy is thus not as distinct from health
care policy as developed nations assert.1 Choices to encourage
development by granting monopoly powers directly affect
current drug prices and limit treatment options for the poor.2"4
Argentina's system of compulsory licensing provides competition
to U.S. drug manufacturers and, in general, lowers prices.2"' One
208 The Argentine pharmaceutical industry exerts a broad influence on
Congress. See Nash, U.S. Presses Argentina on Patents, supra note 18, at D3. It
has effectively lobbied against strongpressure from President Menem. See
Nash, Gore Sees Privatization of Global Data Links, supra note 125, at D2.
209 See Ritchie, Dawkins & Vallianatos, supra note 207, at 434.
210 See MacDonald, supra note 10, at 21. This difference probably accounts
for Argentina's relatively successful resistance to international patent
harmonization pressure. See id.
211 The Argentine national drug companies reject charges from
multinational manufacturers that they charge more for their copied versions,
saying their prices are eight to nine percent lower. See Nash, U.S. Presses
Argentina on Patents, supra note 18, at D3.
212 See Samuel Goldreich, U.S. Drug Makers Fear Loss of Patent Protection,
WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1998, at B8.
213 See generally Swidler, supra note 159, at 655. Although Swidler notes
the distinction between the state's role in promoting new technology and
making choices to regulate it, he finds that the state functions overlap and are
occasionally at odds with each other, especially for expensive innovations. See
id. If an innovator is able to patent a new technology and invoke Medicaid law
to force states to purchase its product, it enjoys a huge compulsory market. See
id. at 672-73.
214 See, e.g., Yang, supra note 134, at 34 (discussing how AZT's price-tag
puts it out of reach of most HIV-positive patients).
215 Mossinghoff concedes that "patent pirates" in Argentina contribute to
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study finds that nearly all pharmaceuticals marketed by Argentine
drug firms are sold at prices fifteen to eighty percent lower than
global corporation prices.216 For example, Glaxo's anti-ulcer
drug, Zantac, sells for $91 in the United States, but Glaxo charges
only $18 in Argentina." National companies that make a similar
product charge about $13.21
Moral arguments for public health availability lie beneath the
surface of the patent protection debate."9 Even the United States
has several exceptions for patentability in the public interest."
The social value of new innovation is diminished when it is only
available to a select few because of monopoly pricing. The drug
AZT, for example, is so expensive that the majority of patients
depressed drug prices. See Mossinghoff Testimony,supra note 24.
216 See Ritchie et al., supra note 207, at 442.
217 See Argentine Senate Group against Patents Bill, supra note 132. Glaxo's
Ranitidine was sold in Argentina for $21.95, while in the United States it cost
$84.23. See Patents: Private Rights and Public Interests, supra note 121.
218 See Argentine Senate Group against Patents Bill, supra note 132.
219 The medical profession has historically distrusted "patent medicines" as
being contrary to the philanthropic nature of a physician's profession. Early
court decisions reveal judicial hostility to medical patents. See Yang, supra note
134, at 3.
South American patent laws demonstrate how the new trade regimen
can corrode self-determination and crowd out equity, even where
important policy goals such as access to health care are concerned.
Multinationals will reap the benefits of expanded patent drug
trafficking, as wealth shifs from South American consumers to North
American pharmaceutical giants and as monopoly drug prices rise
beyond the reach of the poor.
U.S. Drug Trafficking in South America, Editorial, MULTINATIONAL MONrTOR,
Nov. 1, 1995, at 5.
Furthermore, Argentina, a largely Catholic country, sympathizes
somewhat with Catholic influences which protest patents for biotec nology
for similar philanthropic reasons. See Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Seminar
on Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Latin America: Free Markets in Latin
America: New Games-New Rules, supra note 44, at 261 (remarks of Robert M.
Sherwood).
220 For national security reasons, inventions using fissionable material or
weapons grade materials are statutorily unpatentable. See 42 U.S.C. 5 2181
(1988). Compulsory licenses may be granted by the Department of
Agriculture under certain circumstances of public need for a reasonable price.
See 7 U.S.C. 5 2404 (1988). The Attorney General may also demand a
compulsory license under the Clean Air Act of 1970 when a monopoly would
not serve the public interest. See 42 U.S.C. S 7608 (1988). See generally Yang,




infected with the -HV virus cannot afford the treatment." AZT,
tested and identified as effective against IV in U.S. government
laboratories, is the quintessential example of unjustified
monopoly pricing.'m Burroughs Wellcome, which acquired
exclusive rights for the drug, contributed only to its very early
development.'
3.3.7. Autonomy Threatened by Cross Sector Sanctions
Public health and democratic autonomy concerns justify the
recognition that valid legal alternatives exist to the strict regime
the United States would like to impose on Argentina.24 Such
regimes, however, fall into disfavor under strong U.S. coercive
cross-sector sanctions. Other non-drug industries in Argentina
that are affected by the sanctions are thus invited to join the U.S.
drug industry in overcoming resistance to strong patent
protection.' Even if stronger patent legislation is achieved, it is
less likely to reflect true political will when conceived by these
cross-sector sanctions.
22 See Yang, supra note 134, at 34.
See id.; Weissman, supra note 9, at 1092 n.135.
2 See generally Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab. Inc., 40 F.3d 1223,
1231-32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) olding that Burroughs Wellcome's AZT patents
were valid despite the difficult question of whether Burroughs Wellcome
inventors actually conceived the invention themselves).
224 See, e.g., Weissman, supra note 9, at 1071-75 (emphasizing that there is
more than one single approach to patent policy).
I See id., at 1095-96. The USTR withdrew trade benefits from such
Argentine exports as metals and metal products, chemicals, raw cane sugar,
anchovies, and garlic. See Argentina to Lose Benefits Due to Lack of IPR
Protection, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Apr. 17, 1997, at D1.
The cross-sector sanctions ironically hurt American companies which rely
on Argentine exports more than they affect the Argentine g industry. See
Rossella Brevetti, PhRMA Says Stronger Action on Argentina IP May Be
Required, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Feb. 26, 1997. One leather tannery owner
complained that he had spent time and effort developing a relationship with a
reliable Argentine leather supplier and the increased import costs would
jeopardize jobs and market share. See id.
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4. ALTERNATIVES TO PATENT PROTECTION
4.1. Speculative Benefits of a Strong Patent Regime
Patent law legislation in Argentina has far from ended the
debate on the question of Argentina's national sovereignty to
decide the strength of its patent laws. Unfortunately, there is
little empirical evidence to resolve whether U.S. profit-seeking
paternalism may contribute to meaningful processes of discovery
and invention in Argentina that will outweigh the cost to
Argentina of having a strong intellectual property regime."'
Comparative studies of developing nations with and without
strong intellectual property regimes are influenced by too many
other more determinative trade factors to be conclusive about
intellectual property contribution for a particular result.
4.2. Ineffective Forced Legislation
Respect for patent rights begins independently of legislation.
Robert Sherwood, an advocate of strong intellectual property
rights, concedes that there are "distinct limits to what can result
from forcing legislation," saying that "there are at least a hundred
ways in which the patent office can defeat you."' The U.S. drug
industry's main strategy depends on persuading U.S. policy
makers to coerce third world countries. 8 The drug industry
should invest more heavily in non-patent alternatives to
supplement the questionable victories of its foreign legislative
battles, particularly in strategies that foster respect for a strong
intellectual property regime.
226 See GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 19,
at 67.
27 Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Seminar on Legal Aspects of Doing
Business in Latin America: Free Markets in Latin America: New Games-New
Rules, supra note 44, at 260-262; see also Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property
Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis, Coercion, and Choice,
49 INT'L ORG., 314, 317 (1995) (finding that weak states often resist external
coercion for intellectual property protection even at substantial costs to
themselves - they may change their policies but not their minds).
22' See Weissman, supra note 9, at 1075.
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4.3. Encourage Foreign Research
Such strategies include encouraging research and development
activities. Once a base is established, research activities generally
inspire respect for intellectual property rights. 9  Anecdotal
evidence suggests that research students who study in a developed
country with strong patent protection often return home
frustrated because they cannot market their discoveries in their
own country without being immediately copied." Drug
companies should encourage foreign research with their dollars,
not just the protection of domestic research. 1
4.4. Industry Partnerships
Forming partnerships of respect with domestic industries also
fosters patent protection. Drug companies should take note of
Microsoft's aggressive marketing strategies abroad. In China,
Microsoft builds friendships with various ministries and major
manufacturers who become more committed to working with
Microsoft in the future and supporting Microsoft operating
systems. 232 Recent patent protection legislation threatens the
Argentine drug copy industry, putting U.S. drug companies in a
favorable negotiating position for forming similar business
partnerships. 3
4.5. JudicialReform
An ineffective judicial system severely threatens opportunities
for legislation to take effect. In many countries, judicial ineptness
is a delicate topic, although some Argentine officials are quite
open about it." United Nations agencies provide some funding
,, See Park & Ginarte, supra note 124, at 60.
230 See Robert M. Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System
Makes Sense for the World, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 18.
231 See generally Lewis, supra note 25, at 855-856 (encouraging investment
in foreign countries to increase respect for intellectual property protection).
232 See Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property
Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1081, 1121-22 nn.195, 197 (1996).
2" See Price Hikes Drive Latin America'sPharma Market, supra note 155.
See Robert M. Sherwood, supra note 11, at 537.
Prior to Clinton's recent visit to Argentina, corruption and the judiciary's
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for judicial reform. Japan and the United States have both
contributed money for judicial reform efforts. 35 As Sherwood
says, however, "[j]udicial reform is essentially a matter of political
will." 36  Given the extent that PhRMA frustrates the political
will of Argentina, specific PhRMA-friendly judicial reforms are
unlikely. Contributions for general reform and training could
have some effect on improving judicial administration of patent
legislation. However, PhRMA and other lobbying organizations
should not contribute in a way that threatens the impartiality of
Argentine courts of law.
4.6. Contracts and Segmentation
Patents may also be protected through contract agreements
with future distributors, although information asymmetry
obscures the costs and potential value of discoveries. Such
agreements are expensive to tailor to unique situations, but afford
an alternative where patent protection does not exist." Drug
companies in developing countries also engage in research
segmentation." The important development steps of drugs-in-
progress are compartmentalized so that no single employee can
later divulge the complete discovery to a competitor. 9 This
tactic, however, discourages dissemination of information and
collaborative research efforts.24
4.7. Product Loyalty
Large companies, which make up the bulk of the U.S. drug
lack of independence were two key items on his agenda to which he did not
refer in public. Argentina's former president Raul Alfonsin, Senator Graciela
Fernandez Meijide, UCR political party president Rodolfo Terragno, and
Buenos Aires Mayor Fernando de laRua all stressed the problems plaguing the
legal system, although Clinton did not discuss the topic withMenem on his
visit, according to Argentine Foreign Minister GuidoDi Tella. See Argentina -
U.S.: Clinton Reaffirms Alliance with Argentina, supra note 8.
235 See Sherwood, supra note 11, at 543.
236 Id. at 544.
" See David, supra note 107, at 33-34.
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industry, rely less on patent protection than small companies."
Brand-name recognition through trademarks is critical for
product promotion, often insulating drug companies from
meaningful competition.' Companies can also encourage
product loyalty with direct marketing to doctors. Older-style
direct-to-doctor market methods still permit multinational
companies to do well in the developing world even as these
methods are phased out in the developed world.243
5. CONCLUSION
The situation in Argentina exemplifies the ongoing global
conflict concerning the proper scope of drug patent protection.
Argentina has signed international agreements and made some
additional steps to appease the demands of the U.S. drug industry
by passing legislation to protect patented drugs from copiers.
These steps mark a significant departure from its historical
resistance to outside pressure and refusal to protect
pharmaceuticals at all. Unlike Brazil, however, it continues to
assert its national sovereignty to charter its own course of
protection for some issues, thus inviting U.S. Trade
Representative sanctions. The recent flurry of activity highlights
the traditional story of patent protection: stronger protection
means some gain and some loss. Argentina's youthful industrial
base may well benefit from stronger patent protection, even if
coerced from abroad. Stronger patent rights could unlock
Argentina's own research capabilities, paving the way for arms-
length trading relationships within MERCOSUR and in the
proposed FTAA. It is more likely, however, that the push for
harmonization of patent protection will bring further instability
to the young democracy, unleashing anti-U.S. sentiment that is
still quite fresh in Argentina's memory.
241 See Mansfield, supra note 150, at 66.
242 See GEREFFI, supra note 20, at 206. The brand-name system is critical to
promotional activity, just as the patent system is the cornerstone of research
activity. There exist, on average, 30 names for each prescription product.
243 Direct-to-doctor marketing in Latin America has been prone to abuse
by the drug industry, however. See Health Care in the Developing World, supra
note 12. One 1970s study found that drug companies gave more
comprehensive warnings about potential adverse drug reactions to U.S. doctors
than to Latin American doctors. See GEREFFI, supra note 20, at 209.
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Fortunately, differences in opinion about intellectual property
rights are not known to inspire deadly conflicts within or
between nations, although the issue has brought considerable
tension to international relations in recent years. Patent conflicts
typically occur between nations that are already significant
trading partners. Intellectual property rights may enable the
more developed country to sweeten the trading relationship in its
favor. The potential gains of this sweetening have spurred
alarming attempts by the U.S. drug industry to coerce foreign
legislation. It should instead focus its investment-maximization
tactics into less coercive and more meaningful methods.
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